• The decisive victory of Ukraine and defeat of Russia are critical to European and global security. All necessary measures, including timely military, economic, political and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, must be provided to bring Ukraine’s victory in the war as soon as possible and to prevent the further erosion of global security.  • Despite the Western alliance being economically twenty-five times stronger than the Russian Federation and possessing the sufficient economic strength for bolstering Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s war of aggression, the alliance’s potential for support has not yet been fully realised.  • In 2023, Russia spent over 100 billion euros on its military operations in Ukraine, surpassing Ukraine's defence spending, which amounted to 80 billion euros even with assistance from the West.  • Russia allocated 6% of its GDP to the war, in contrast to Ukraine’s 25%, while the EU provided a mere 0.075% in military assistance to Ukraine and the United States contributed 0.10% of their GDP.  • Military support from the West has enabled Ukraine not to lose the war, but it has been insufficient to achieve victory.  • The level of military assistance varies among EU countries, since the decisions to support by different countries are done on individual voluntary bases: during the last two years, Lithuania and Estonia committed 1.2% of their GDP; Germany increased its support to 0.5%, while France’s contribution remained at 0.02%.  • Such a deteriorating situation demands radical and urgent change to the system of Western nations’ political, economic and military assistance to counter the security threats from Russia and its allies worldwide. If the system is not changed in the near future, Ukraine will soon face threats on the battlefield, which will embolden Russia to expand its aggressive plans beyond Ukraine. This situation must be considered totally unacceptable to Western democracies. Russia must be defeated in Ukraine as soon as possible, and the West must do everything needed to achieve this strategic goal.  • The biggest shortcoming of the military assistance system is that it is based on countries’ individual and voluntary decisions. After military stocks were emptied in those countries,  The publication of this document received financial support from the European Parliament. Sole liability rests with the author. The European Parliament is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.  it now depends on Western military industry capacity, which is still below the needs of the support to Ukraine.  • However, we have examples of a more successful collective approach towards EU assistance to Ukraine - the “Ukraine facility”, with its EUR 50 billion support package as well as the EU Plan for Ammunition delivery, which despite its shortcomings, is a good example of how the EU needs to act in a collective way.  • The goal of the Putin regime is to eliminate Ukrainian statehood and subdue the Ukrainian nation to the will of the Kremlin. It is of vital importance to ensure the membership of Ukraine in the European Union and NATO once all criteria are fulfilled, as integral elements of the Western vision for the future of Ukraine. An independent, secure, democratic and prosperous Ukraine is vital for Europe’s security architecture and its role in regional and global politics.  • The commitment to reforms and the strong political will to join the EU and NATO shared by the Ukrainian political elites, civil society and an absolute majority of Ukrainian citizens must be fully supported on a merit-based approach. Such comprehensive support should be pre-conditioned by full respect by the Ukrainian authorities for effective democratic mechanisms and its institutions, including a multi-party parliamentary system, the rule of law, freedom of media, the rights of opposition and to guarantee respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.  • That is why the EPP Congress urgently asks:  − the European Commission and NATO to prepare, adopt and implement in the near future a clear collective Plan for Victory of Ukraine with political, economic and military support to Ukraine. This is needed for the victory of Ukraine and would cover political, diplomatic, financial and economic needs and military equipment.  − The Plan needs to ensure that Western military support will be annually larger than 0.25 % of the Western GDP. It would generate three times more military support to Ukraine than Ukraine received in 2023. It would allow Ukraine to start accumulating the needed reserves to prevail against Russian forces in 2025-2026;  − The EU Plan should envisage constant consultations and coordination with key political stakeholders in Ukraine along the political spectrum aiming at inclusiveness and the bolstering of internal unity;  − In order to achieve such a crucial level of assistance, each EU Member State needs to increase its individual support.  − The EU Plan for Victory of Ukraine needs to have “plan B” calculations if the United States Congress fails to agree on the support for Ukraine. In that case, the EU needs to be ready to step in and to cover those amounts, which the US could potentially fail to deliver;  The publication of this document received financial support from the European Parliament. Sole liability rests with the author. The European Parliament is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.  − The EU Plan should give clear priority for assistance to the development of the Ukrainian military industry, which can produce what is needed for the victory. The EU Plan should also present a blueprint for how the capacities of European military industries will be ramped up in the nearest future to guarantee the supply of the military equipment needed for Ukraine’s victory;  − The EU Plan should elaborate how best to prioritise defence procurements and deliveries to satisfy Ukraine’s needs, just as was successfully done during the pandemic with vaccines or, for example, with natural gas.  − The EU Plan should envisage concrete actions to undermine the ability of Russia and its allies to continue the war of aggression against Ukraine, including through more efficient sanctions regime;  − The EU Plan should be subject to continuous monitoring and verification in terms of its effective implementation in order to exclude shortcomings and deficiencies in the process and to secure efficiency of budget use, including by means of an external scrutiny by respective EU instruments and internal supervision in Ukraine that is independent, trusted, inclusive and unbiased.  − The EU Plan should envisage that 2024 will be a year of strategic build-up and defence for both Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic community. The pace and outlook of defeat for Russia will rapidly accelerate through 2025 with the implementation of the EU Plan, when European defence-industrial output reaches new levels. With that ever-growing and strengthening resolve, Ukraine will indeed win and Russia will be defeated by 2026 the latest.